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A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR RUBENFELD

Jonathan D. Hacker*
Professor Jed Rubenfeld has offered in these pages1 an inge
nious explanation for why the Supreme Court was right to strike

City of
Flores.3 Rubenfeld finds in the First Amendment's

down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)2 in

Boerne

v.

Establishment Clause a historical and inherent principle he calls
"antidisestablishmentarianism": a prohibition on acts of Congress
that "disestablish" religion in the several states. Rubenfeld reads
the Establishment Clause as proscribing not only congressional acts
that "establish" religion but also all congressional acts that "dictate
a position on religion for states,"4 including laws designed to ensure
that states abide by the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause.
RFRA was unconstitutional, Rubenfeld argues, because it trans
gressed this

principle.

As the title

of his Article

suggests,

Rubenfeld's explanation is so ingenious, in fact, that it did not even
occur to the Justices who signed the

Boerne majority opinion.

In reasoning that Rubenfeld banishes to a footnote,5 the Court
in

Boerne modestly held that RFRA exceeded Congress's power to

enforce the Fourteenth Amendment under Section 5 of that
Amendment, because the RFRA's legislative scheme was not "con
gruent" or "proportional" to the harm Congress identified in enact
ing the law.6 Importantly,

Boerne explicitly reaffirms Congress's

long-recognized power under Section 5 to pass laws reasonably
designed to remedy or deter state actions that violate the Constitu
tion, even if such laws, in their operation, also prohibit actions that
are themselves constitutionally permissible.7
* Associate, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C. A.B. 1990, Harvard; J.D. 1995, University of
Michigan. - Ed. I am extremely grateful for the helpful comments of Kristen Donoghue,
Scott Idleman, and Michael Kent Curtis.

1. Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitu·
tional, 95 MrCH. L. REv. 2347 {1997).
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 141, 107 Stat. 1488 {1993).
3. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
4. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2357.
5. See id. at 2349 n.15.
6. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164, 2171.
7. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163 {"Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it
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The problem with RFRA, according to
not even

Boerne, was that it was
targeted at unconstitutional state actions. The legislative

record generated in support of RFRA was replete with instances in
which seemingly neutral laws of general applicability imposed se
"burdens" on religious practices.8 But in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,9 the Court had
vere

made clear that a state law of general applicability simply does not
violate the First Amendment, no matter how significant its burden
on the free exercise of religion, absent some evidence of discrimina
tory motivation.10 To the Boerne Court, the extensive factual find
ings underpinning RFRA - all concerning "burdens" on religious
practice - failed to reveal any evidence at all of unconstitutional
state actions as

Smith defined them:

It is difficult to maintain that [the state and municipal laws Congress
identified in support of RFRA] are examples of legislation enacted or
enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices
or that they indicate some widespread pattern of religious discrimina
tion in this country. Congress' concern was with the incidental bur
dens imposed, not the object or purpose of the legislation.11

Boerne does little more than confirm the lesson of Smith: burdens
alone - even crushing, destructive burdens - are not enough to
render a law affecting religious practices unconstitutional.
Once the Court determined that the legislative record was es
sentially devoid of examples of constitutional violations as the
Court understood them,12 there was no hope for RFRA at all.

Any

congressional scheme to remedy or deter constitutional violations
goes too far if there are no constitutional violations to remedy or
deter.13 So of course RFRA lacked "proportionality" and "congru
ence." That is all the Boerne Court really held.
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States.'" (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455
(1976))).
8. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
11. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169.
12. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171 {"Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and
counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion. In
most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have been moti
vated by religious bigotry.").
13. What Congress needed to do was to build a legislative record demonstrating that state
actions that appear to be neutral and generally applicable in fact frequently conceal official
animus against religious practices. It may also be enough to show that government actors,
when presented with evidence of severe burdens and a proposal for accommodation or ex
emption, consistently refuse to yield. Because direct evidence of antireligious animus is un-
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Rubenfeld's story is much more dramatic. On the one hand,

Boerne suggests that if Congress were able to build a record dem
onstrating widespread state animus toward religious practices, and
then passed a law requiring states to exempt religious exercisers
from the reach of all generally applicable laws imposing an undue
burden on such exercises, such a law would be well within
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.
Rubenfeld, on the other hand, is certain that such a law, and any
law like it, would still be unconstitutional, because of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.14
As Rubenfeld reads its text and enacting history, the Establishment Clause
does not only prohibit Congress from establishing religion; it prohibits
Congress from dictating to the states how to legislate religion. The
First Amendment excludes Congress from an entire legislative subject
matter. Congress may not dictate a position on religion to individu
als, and it may not dictate a position on religion to the states.15

Tb.us RFRA's vice was not - as the Court concluded - that it was
a response to a nonexistent constitutional problem, or that it was an
overreaction to a minor constitutional problem; RFRA "really was
unconstitutional" because the First Amendment specifically prohib
its Congress from "disestablishing" religion in the several states.
Not only was RFRA unconstitutional, but

any congressional en

actment designed to deter states from abridging the free exercise of
religion - regardless of the evidence of state transgressions - vio
lates the antidisestablishmentarian principle and therefore the Es
tablishment Clause.16 According to Rubenfeld, laws that protect
free exercise disestablish religion, and laws that disestablish religion
offend the First Amendment.
Or at least they offend Rubenfeld. I'm not so sure they offend
the First Amendment. Not anymore.
I want to suggest in this Correspondence that history has over
taken, and nullified, Rubenfeld's interpretation of the Clause. Far
from being "essential to the fundamental constitutional separation
of religion and government,"17 as Rubenfeld claims it to be, in my
likely to be forthcoming, see Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2169, evidence of a kind of latent animus
may be the best hope for supporters of a new RFRA.
14. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2349.
15. Id. at 2350.
16. See id. at 2357 ("A disestablishmentarian law will characteristically vindicate toler
ance and free exercise . . . . To the extent that states can constitutionally enact laws favoring
one religion over others, Congress can make no law instructing them not to do so."); id. at
2374.
17. Id. at 2350.
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view the antidisestablishmentarian principle today serves no consti
tutional function whatsoever, and does not stand in the way of re
sponsible congressional efforts to remedy or deter violations of the
Free Exercise Clause.
*

*

*

Rubenfeld argues that antidisestablishmentarianism is part of
the very core of the Establishment Clause. He offers a brief but
fascinating history of the Founding period, which reveals to the his
torically uninitiated the prevalence of established religions in and
among the several states at the time. Rubenfeld acknowledges that
there were "powerful antiestablishment" forces backing the First
Amendment, who demanded the Establishment Clause as a guaran
tee that Congress would not establish a national church.18 But
Rubenfeld also points out that others were loudly voicing antidis
establishment concerns. These members of the founding genera
tion sought "to memorialize Congress's inability to 'interfere' or
'intermeddle' with [state] religious establishments."19 In the end,
the somewhat peculiar final wording of the Establishment Clause
- the seemingly ambiguous proscription of congressional acts

"re
specting an establishment of religion"20 - was apparently a sop
thrown to the New England states so that they could "insulate their
states' local-establishment systems from federal attack."21
From this history Rubenfeld draws the not unreasonable conclu
sion that '"[r]especting' means 'with respect to' or 'regarding.'
Congress can make no law

concerning an establishment of reli

gion."22 And it follows from this, he says, that "Congress has no
power to dictate a position on religion for individuals, and it has no
power to dictate a position on religion for states. It has no power to
dictate church-state relations at all - where 'state' refers to the
governments of the several states."23
*

*

*

The logical connection between these points is not airtight, but
the formulation makes at least some sense, as far as it goes. It goes
18. Id. at 2354.
19. Id.
20. U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphasis added).
21. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2355-56.
22. Id. at 2356.
23. See id. at 2377.
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no farther, however, than the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the sub
sequent application of the Establishment Clause to the states,24
formally eradicated the specific concerns underlying the original an
tidisestablishmentarian aspects of the First Amendment: States no
longer have religious establishments with any constitutional claim
to protection from federal interference. State religious establish
ments are gone - and with them, the very basis for the antidisest
ablishmentarian principle. The rest of the Establishment Clause
goes on with the hard work of prohibiting establishments, but
what's left of antidisestablishmentarianism is a hollow idea, a prin
ciple tilting at windmills.zs
But the Fourteenth Amendment did more than prohibit state
religious establishments; it also gave persons the right to be free
from state interference in the free exercise of their religions.26
When the original antidisestablishmentarian principle developed,
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment did not apply to
the states.27 States could - and did - interfere with the free exer
cise of religion whenever they wanted. The Fourteenth Amend
ment changed all of that. The Amendment meant that, for the first
time, the right to the free exercise of religion was a right protected
against infringement by any of the several states. In this sense, the
Fourteenth Amendment did no more or less with respect to the fed
eral right of free religious exercise than it did with respect to other
federal rights: it applied them as against the states and empowered
Congress to enforce them by remedying or deterring violations.28 It
is thus a perfectly straightforward interpretation of the Fourteenth
24. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1963) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact
laws [respecting an establishment of religion]." (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940))); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In fact, all formal state
establishments were apparently eradicated well prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See SANFORD H. COBB, THE R.IsE OF REumous LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902).
The incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment merely formalized a reality in the evolution of the concept of religious liberty in
this nation that had taken place decades earlier.
25. Justice Brennan once observed that antidisestablishmentarianism had "become his
torical anachronism by 1868." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., concurring). See infra
note 29.
26. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
27. See, e.g., Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609
(1845) (explaining that a municipal law allegedly abridging free exercise of religion presents
no cognizable federal constitutional question).
28. See Patsy v. F lorida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) ("The Civil Rights Act
of 1871, along with the Fourteenth Amendment it was enacted to enforce, were crucial ingre
dients in the basic alteration of our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction
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Amendment to conclude that Section 5 authorizes Congress to pass
a law enforcing the right to free exercise, so long as it does so within
the usual confines of its Section 5 powers.29
Rubenfeld tries to defeat this logic by insisting on a special priv
ilege for the antidisestablishmentarian principle in the hierarchy of
federal rights. Rubenfeld argues that the Fourteenth Amendment's
shift of power away from the states and toward the federal govern
ment did not actually affect the antidisestablishmentarian principle
because the principle is

and always was about something much

deeper than federal-state relations:
[A]s I have tried to show throughout, the First Amendment's antidis
establishmentarian component is not and never was merely a protec
tion of federalism. It is not merely a states' rights or state sovereignty
provision. First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism is a bul
wark of religious freedom. It is a bulwark of the fundamental princi
ple of separation ...between the national government and religious
affairs.30

Era. During that time, the Federal Government was clearly established as a guarantor of the
basic federal rights of individuals against incursions by state power.").
29. This analysis is consistent with the view articulated by Justice Brennan in Schempp.
Responding to an earlier incarnation of the argument that an antidisestablishmentarian prin
ciple survived and even trumped the Fourteenth Amendment - that incorporation of the
Establishment Clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment was "conceptually
impossible because the Framers meant the Establishment Clause also to foreclose any at
tempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official state churches," Schempp, 374 U.S. at
254 - Justice Brennan explained:
Whether or not such was the understanding of the Framers and whether such a purpose
would have inhibited the absorption of the Establishment Clause at the threshold of the
Nineteenth Century are questions not dispositive of our present inquiry. For it is clear
on the record of history that the last of the formal state establishments was dissolved
more than three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and thus the
problem of protecting official state churches from federal encroachments could hardly
have been any concern of those who framed the post-Civil War Amendments. Any such
objective of the First Amendment, having become historical anachronism by 1868, can
not be thought to have deterred the absorption of the Establishment Clause to any
greater degree than it would, for example, have deterred the absorption of the Free
Exercise Clause. That no organ of the Federal Government possessed in 1791 any
power to restrain the interference of the States in religious matters is indisputable. It is
equally plain, on the other hand, that the Fourteenth Amendment created a panoply of
new federal rights for the protection of citizens of the various States. And among those
rights was freedom from such state governmental involvement in the affairs of religion as
the Establishment Clause had originally foreclosed on the part of Congress.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 254-55 (citations and footnotes omitted). Also included among the
"panoply of new federal rights" was the freedom from state governmental interference in the
free exercise of religion. And Congress's new power to enforce this right would surely trump
the "historical anachronism" of antidisestablishmentarianism.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has also made the related point that the dramatic change in inter
governmental powers since the founding era makes it impossible to tell how the original
founders would view the meaning of the Establishment Clause today: "Because those who
drafted and adopted the Frrst Amendment could not have foreseen either the growth of
social welfare legislation or the incorporation of the Frrst Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment, we simply do not know how they would view the scope of the two Clauses."
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 722 {1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2375-76.
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On this basis, Rubenfeld is able to assert that "[t]he erosion of state
sovereignty effected by the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes no
reason to erode the religious liberty protected by the First."31 In
deed, Rubenfeld explains, it would actually be "profoundly per
verse"32 to read the Fourteenth Amendment - which enhanced
the separation of church and state by prohibiting state establish
ments - in a way that would "cut back on a fundamental element
of

the

constitutional

separation

between

religion

and

government."33
The problem with this argument is that it is simply not sup
ported by the very historical evidence Rubenfeld reports at the out
set of his article. The history he recites is quite specific: certain
members of the founding generation were concerned about protect
ing their state establishments and therefore insisted on the "re
specting" language in the Establishment Clause.

As Rubenfeld

himself tells the story, the fight against disestablishment was a nar
row, focused commitment to saving formal state establishments. It
is wrong to say, as Rubenfeld does, that the antidisestablish
mentarian principle was not "merely a protection of federalism"
and "not merely a states' rights or state sovereignty provision."
The history of the period shows that antidisest_ablishmentarianism
became part of the First Amendment as a result of parochial Real
politik and not a debate over the meaning and content of religious
liberty. In short, antidisestablishmentarianism was only a "protec
tion of federalism" and only a "states' rights or state sovereignty
provision."
Indeed, the Founders would have had no reason at all to think
about antidisestablishmentarianism as the general inoculation
against federal enforcement of free exercise that Rubenfeld makes
it out to be. As noted earlier, at the time of the drafting and ratifi
cation of the First Amendment, the individual federal right to be
free from state abridgments of the free exercise of religion simply
did not exist. Nor was there an obvious constitutional basis at the
time for a congressional enactment enforcing this nonexistent right.
Congressional interference with states' abridgments of free exercise
assumes either a right to be protected - which did not exist - or
congressional power to act - which probably did not exist - or
both. Under these historical circumstances, the inference that the
Founders saw in the Establishment Clause an abiding prophylactic
31. Id. at 2376.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2377.
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against congressional enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause is
unsupportable.
History, then, reveals nothing "fundamental" at all about the
antidisestablishmentarian principle - as Rubenfeld elucidates it to the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. There is therefore
nothing especially "perverse" about interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment as empowering Congress to enforce the federal right
against state abridgments of the free exercise of religion.
Rubenfeld's interpretation of the Establishment Clause appears
to suffer from a logical error that infects his view of the Clause's
history and meaning. Rubenfeld's analysis strictly equates laws that
deter free exercise violations with laws that interfere with state es
tablishments of religions. Doctrinally, however, the two are not
equivalent. A state action that infringes the federal right of free
exercise does not necessarily establish state religion. Thus, a con
gressional enactment designed to deter state actions that abridge
the federal right of free exercise does not necessarily deter state
establishments - or "disestablish" religion.
Nor is the doctrinal disjunction between laws deterring free ex
ercise violations and laws disestablishing religion merely an empty
modem formalism. As I have attempted to show (on the basis of
the evidence Rubenfeld has collected), the Founders were con
cerned only about congressional laws disestablishing formal state
religious institutions and practices; they had no reason at the time
to anticipate congressional laws enforcing the Free Exercise Clause.
Rubenfeld's view of the historical record overlooks this distinction:
Some Americans of the founding era - including such towering
figures as Jefferson and Madison - believed that all government
should keep its hands, to the greatest extent possible, out of the do
main of religion. Others believed, on the contrary, that state or local
government had the authority to intercede directly in religious life.
But both parties agreed that the national government should be kept
out. Virtually everyone agreed that vesting Congress with a power to
intermeddle in religious matters was a core evil to be avoided.34

Once again, Rubenfeld seems to draw too much from the historical
evidence he reports at the outset of the article. By his own account,
the

specific "evil" that "everyone" sought to avoid was nothing

more than Congress's establishment of a national church or reli
gion. And the "towering figures" of early American liberalism who
sought to keep Congress out of the "domain of religion" intended
only to keep Congress from establishing religion. Such a commit34. Id.

at 2377 (footnotes omitted).
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ment is not necessarily inconsistent with allowing Congress to make
sure that states, too, keep out of the domain of religion - so long
as such supervision does not amount to the kind of congressional
act of establishment that was, in fact, universally reviled.
In short, neither history nor logic compels the heavy reading of
the Establishment Clause that Rubenfeld pursues.35 The most im
portant point is that the story of congressional enforcement of the
Free Exercise Clause was written by the Fourteenth Amendment
generation, and that the original Founders had little or nothing to
say about such matters. As with congressional enforcement of
every other federal constitutional right, then, it is to basic Four
teenth Amendment principles that one ought to tum - as the

Boerne Court did - to interpret and adjudicate congressional ef
forts to enforce the federal right to the free exercise of religion.
But what of Rubenfeld's claim that giving full force and effect to
the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the First would be tanta
mount to "repealing" the Establishment Clause? To begin with, as
I have argued, it certainly would not be "repealing" any aspect of
the First Amendment that the Fourteenth Amendment did not al
ready totally eviscerate by abolishing state establishments. More to
the point, it also would not repeal any aspect of the text of the
Clause. It is clear, of course, that the Establishment Clause has sur
vived, and even prospered, since the Fourteenth Amendment re
lieved the Clause of its antidisestablishmentarian baggage. The
Amendment did not change the words of the Clause: it still says
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli
gion." What the Fourteenth Amendment did was to change pro
foundly the

meaning of these words. As a result of the Fourteenth

Amendment, the same language that used to enjoin only Congress
now enjoins state legislatures as well, and means at least that states,
like Congress, cannot make laws "respecting an establishment of
religion." If antidisestablishmentarianism were inherent in these
35. Rubenfeld also proposes a couple of wild hypotheticals he says could constitutionally
result unless we read the Establishment Clause his way. He warns that Congress might be
allowed to enact a law forcing states to permit marriage between any persons or as many
persons as they wish, or forcing states to ensure that parents expose their children to more
than one religion. As to the first: if, in fact, Congress turned up extensive evidence that
marriage laws were passed out of actual animus toward certain religions, then I suppose such
a law would be constitutional under Boerne. Such a record would likely be impossible to
generate, however, so antidisestablishmentarianism is not needed to save the day. And if it
were true that hatred of minority religions was so pervasive that it motivated such co=on
Jaws, then I would not be particularly troubled if Congress got involved to provide an anti
dote to such venom. As to the second: such a law would blatantly violate the free exercise
rights of nonconsenting adult parents, so (once again) the antidisestablishmentarian principle
serves only to pile on.
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words, the Establishment Clause would mean - in the wake of in
corporation - that states could not disestablish their own state reli
gions.36 The words of the Clause do not compel this ridiculous
result, which demonstrates that the antidisestablishmentarian prin
ciple is hardly inherent in the words of the Establishment Clause.
Giving effect to the Fourteenth Amendment, then, in no way "re
peals" the Establishment Clause. To the contrary, the text of the
Clause continues to provide a meaningful and vital restraint on at
tempts by Congress - and, after incorporation, the states and all
other government actors - to establish religion.
*

*

*

For all of these reasons, then, I believe Rubenfeld is wrong to
treat Congress's power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause via Sec
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as dismissively as he does.37
Any effort by Congress to enforce the Free Exercise Clause, he
breezes, would disestablish religion, and anything that disestab
lishes religion violates the Establishment Clause, and Congress can
not do anything under Section 5 that violates another constitutional
provision. But, as I have suggested, the Establishment Clause does
not (and never really did) prohibit the free-exercise-enforcing laws
Rubenfeld here labels disestablishments. These days the Clause
prohibits establishments, and has nothing to say about whether
Congress has the power under Section 5 to ensure that states obey
36. In a slightly different context, Rubenfeld does contrive the argument that antidisest
ablishmentarianism could apply to the states by, for example, precluding a state from passing
a law that required parents to expose their children to more than one religion:
Insofar as parents in essence establish a religion within the family, this statute could be
seen as an attempt to disestablish religion within the sphere of parental authority. Just
as the First Amendment bars Congress from dictating church-state relations, a Four
teenth Amendment antidisestablishmentarian principle could bar states from dictating
church-family relations.
Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 2379 n.124. Far from proving any aspect of Rubenfeld's case,
however, this example demonstrates the lengths to which Rubenfeld must stretch the notions
of "establishment" and "disestablishment" to give his principle any modern relevance. On its
face this hypothetical has nothing whatsoever to do with the kinds of formal state establish
ments, or with the disestablishing laws, he says the Founders were worried about. What is
more, the hypothetical law - forcing religious observance on unconsenting adults - is an
other blatant violation of the Free Exercise Clause. The hypothetical starkly reveals antidis
establishmentarianism for what it is: a useless First Amendment appendage, which at best
gets in the way of other First Amendment principles that actually perform substantive
functions.
37. See id. at 2374 ("Did RFRA "enforce" free exercise rights within the meaning of
section 5? That question, interesting as it is, turns out to be irrelevant. Even if yesterday's
RFRA or tomorrow's new and improved RFRA came within the terms of section 5, it would
still violate the Establishment Clause and hence be unconstitutional.").
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their (post-Fourteenth-Amendment) duty not to abridge the free
exercise of religion.
The question whether Congress properly exercised its Section 5
powers in enacting RFRA, or might properly do so in the future in
enacting a different law on the basis of different findings, is a ques
tion that turns on the scope and limits of its Section 5 powers, as the
Boerne Court recognized. It does not tum on an interpretation of
the First Amendment beholden to anachronistic concerns about
protecting official state churches. The First Amendment today is
much more complicated, and much more important, than that.

